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Choice of Remuneration Regime in Fisheries: 
The Case of Hawaii’s Longline Fisheries 
 
Quang Nguyen and PingSun Leung 
 
One of the most prominent features of remuneration in Hawaii’s longline fisheries 
industry has been the norm of share contract regimes. This paper investigates whether the 
use of the share contract regime is positively correlated to increased economic returns. 
The principal-agent framework is applied to develop a theoretical model for the 
remuneration choice. Empirical estimation is conducted using a switching regression 
model that accounts for the effects of certain vessel characteristics on revenue, depending 
on remuneration regime used (i.e., share contract or flat wage), as well as the potential 
selection bias in the vessels’ contractual choice. Key findings from counterfactual simula-
tions indicate: (a) a negative selection related to choosing share contracts, and (b) flat 
wage vessels would experience significantly higher revenues if they switched to share 
contracts. Thus, even though the labor market in Hawaii’s longline fisheries relies upon 
foreign crew members, the results suggest that owners of flat wage vessels would benefit 
by applying share contracts to increase their revenues. 
 
Key words: commercial fisheries, crew shares, Hawaii, incentive systems, labor contracts, 
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Introduction 
 
The choice of remuneration regime is a matter of great interest in the fisheries industry. There 
are two main remuneration regime types in fisheries: flat wage and share contract. Under the 
flat wage regime, each crew is paid a fixed salary as compensation per pay period (e.g., a 
monthly salary). In the share contract regime,1 the crew receives a percentage of either the 
gross revenue or profit per fishing trip. One of the most distinguishing features of remuner-
ation in fisheries has been the norm of the share contract regime. Alternative remuneration 
regimes, such as fixed wage,2 can be found only in a few fleets around the world. 
 Studies have theoretically shown that the share contract regime is the optimal form of 
remuneration in fisheries (Sutinen, 1979; Plourde and Smith, 1989). However, there has been 
no empirical study to support this theory. Because fixed wage has been surfacing in some 
types of fisheries in recent years, a series of new research inquiries have emerged. For example, 
one is prompted to ask such questions as: Is the dominance of share remuneration coming 
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to an end? Is the recent shift to fixed wage in some fisheries a result of changes in some envi-
ronmental parameters, or has the use of share contracts been based on false beliefs all along? 
 In this study, we apply the principal-agent framework to develop a model for evaluating 
choice of remuneration regimes in fisheries. We show that fixed wage may be a better alterna-
tive to the share contract under certain conditions. We then use the Hawaii longline fisheries 
as a case study to shed some light on the empirical relationship between remuneration regime 
and economic returns in fisheries as well as to provide some explanations for the recent shift 
from share contract regime to flat rate regime in fisheries. 
 
Literature Review on the Determinants 
of Remuneration Regime in Fisheries 
 
Matthiasson (1997) has provided an excellent survey on remuneration practices in fisheries; 
his main conclusion is that the share contract regime has been the dominant remuneration 
system. Other forms of remuneration, such as fixed wage, have also been applied in some 
fisheries though they have been short-lived (Matthiasson, 1997; Sutinen, 1979). In addition to 
the share contract and fixed wage, there is yet another practice of remuneration in fisheries. 
Béné (1997), for instance, reports that the shrimp fishery in French Guyana has applied the 
piece rate contract to avoid mixing of labor shirking with quality bonuses to induce shrimp 
quality since 1985. Like fixed wage, this type of remuneration is relatively rare in fisheries. 
 Share contracts also have been the prevailing regime in the Hawaii longline fisheries until 
recent years. Azabou, Bouzaiane, and Nugent (1989) attribute this general predominance to 
the following: 
 ■ Share contracts generate incentives for the crew to exert optimal fishing effort.3 
 ■ Share contracts share risk between the owner and the crew. 
 ■ Share contracts use resources relatively better than fixed wage contracts, especially 
when taking into account the highly seasonal nature of fisheries. 
 ■ Share contracts encourage teamwork and cooperation, which improve fishing pro-
ductivity. 
 ■ Share contracts combine the comparative advantages of owner and crew for a sharing 
of benefits. For instance, the owner may have better access to credit and to market 
opportunities, while the crew members may be better fishermen. 
 Platteau and Nugent (1992) summarize and examine the comparative vulnerabilities 
between fixed wage and share contract systems (see table 1). Clearly, the popularity of share 
contracts in fisheries can be attributed to the potential benefits from risk sharing and gener-
ating incentives. 
 
The Roles of Incentives 
 
Matthiasson (1997) has developed a theoretical model showing that a pure share contract 
regime motivates a crew to exert more effort than fixed wage or a combination of fixed wage
                                                 
3 In terms of fishing effort, we are interested in labor input on the part of the crew, as opposed to the use of “effort” to mean a 
collective input in fishing. 
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Table 1. Comparative Vulnerability of Different Remuneration Systems 
Type of Vulnerability Fixed Wage Share Contract 
Labor shirking Serious Moderate 
Asset management Serious Moderate 
Output underreporting Serious Moderate 
Input overreporting Serious Moderate 
Quality shirking Slight Slight 
Production risk Borne by owner Shared 
Price risk Borne by owner Shared 
Source: Adapted from Platteau and Nugent (1992). 
 
and share contract regimes at every given wage level. This phenomenon can be attributed to 
incentives. First, it is very difficult for the owner to supervise the fishing operation while the 
vessel is out at sea unless the vessel is owner-operated. Moreover, even if it were possible, the 
cost of supervision would be very high. The hired captain, motivated by her share of the 
profit, would ensure the crew’s industriousness. Second, a typical feature of fisheries is team-
work, whereby the amount of fish caught is determined by the effort of the entire crew; there-
fore, the marginal productivity of an individual fisherman can hardly be specified. A share 
contract gives the crew incentives to work for the common goal. 
 
Risk Sharing 
In addition to incentive, risk behavior also plays a role in the decision related to remuneration 
in fisheries. Platteau and Nugent (1992) point out that fishing is subject to three types of 
simultaneous risk: production risk, price risk, and asset risk. Production risk results from 
uncertainties in both weather and marine ecology. Price risk is due to volatile supply condi-
tions. Asset risk arises from concern associated with loss of assets and human lives. Using 
share contracts can reduce the risk burden for both the vessel owner and crew. Consequently, 
share contracts reveal the risk-averse behavior of the owner or crew. Due to technological 
changes, the role of labor relative to fishing productivity has become less important. 
Expectedly, the simplicity advantage of fixed wage may overcome the risk-sharing effect of 
share contracts. Thus, fixed wage has become increasingly popular over time. 
 While risk sharing is the most cited explanation for the popularity of share contracts in 
fisheries, McConnell and Price (2006) note that a number of questions remain to be addressed. 
First, for the share system to have emerged purely as a means of spreading risk, it must be the 
case that vessel owners are more risk averse than fishermen. However, this method of risk 
diffusion might not be the only solution, as owners may choose to diversify their investments 
through different species, in different locations, and at different times. Second, despite the 
uncertainties and risks associated with fishing, not all owners choose to use share contract 
regimes. 
 
Implications for Modeling Fishery Remuneration Choice 
Share contracts serve two functions: (a) to diffuse risk, and (b) to motivate crews to exert 
high levels of effort without direct owner supervision. Nevertheless, most theoretical models 
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consider these two functions in isolation. Also, predictions from these two approaches are 
different. Sutinen (1979) assumes in his model that both the vessel owner and crew are risk 
averse, that all other means of risk transferring are too costly, and that the transaction costs 
are negligible. Under these assumptions, a rational owner will choose some degree of share 
contract because risk is diffused among the crew, which reduces the cost of risk bearing and 
provides a work incentive making it less costly to generate a high desired level of perform-
ance from the crew. In contrast, if transaction costs are significant, and if there exist other 
risk-shifting means, then the fixed wage may be optimal. 
 Sutinen (1979) also shows that share contracts result in a higher level of employment and 
production. The economic reasoning for this is that the risk-averse owner must earn an 
income sufficiently above what she would earn in alternative settings as compensation for 
bearing the risk. As expected, the owner chooses a risk-sharing alternative which minimizes 
the risk premium. In sharing risk, the owner would pay the crew members less than the 
amount it would cost her if she were able to bear that same risk herself. Accordingly, under a 
share contract regime, the unit cost of production is lower and output is higher compared to a 
fixed wage system. Plourde and Smith (1989) extend Sutinen’s model by integrating an 
output market, biological equilibrium, and regulatory policy into their framework. They 
report that in regulated markets, a fixed wage scheme may be optimal, leading to higher 
returns for fisheries firms. 
 McConnell and Price (2006) point out that incentive mechanisms are just as widely 
accepted as the risk sharing-based model. Matthiasson (1999) develops a model for Icelandic 
fisheries where skippers are paid by share subject to an agreed minimum without sharing 
operating costs. His key finding is that fixed wage and share contracts may coexist as an 
incentive contract when strategy-dependent, skipper-specific costs are important. With regard 
to incentive mechanisms, the most relevant modeling technique is the principal-agent 
approach employed by McConnell and Price. In their model, there are two contracting parties: 
the vessel owner and the crew. The contract consists of two parameters specifying the share 
of ex post revenues and costs for the crew. The possibility that each crew member allocates 
his labor effort independently toward production is also considered. In other words, given the 
assumption of a stochastic resource stock, there is a potential team agency situation. 
Accordingly, remuneration systems based on incentive contracts offer an alternative rationale 
to the risk sharing contract. An interesting finding is that, for a given set of parameter values, 
a remuneration system could include fixed wages independent of effort levels and revenue as 
well as no cost sharing. Along the same line, Platteau and Nugent (1992) reviewed empirical 
studies and found that fixed wages are observed among vessels having difficulty attracting 
qualified captains. Also, flat wages are applied to the crew whose efforts can be easily 
observed and less directly affect the catch level. 
 
A Model of Remuneration Choice in a Fishery 
 
Our model differs from the models discussed above in the sense that it integrates both risk 
sharing and incentive into the analysis. The starting point of our theoretical model is the 
realization that effort level exerted by the crew is unverifiable due to uncontrollable factors 
(e.g., the fishing stock) in the production process. Accordingly, the principal-agent (PA) 
model is most appropriate in addressing the fisheries remuneration strategies. To our know-
ledge, the only previous study using the PA approach is McConnell and Price (2006). 
502   December 2009 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
 According to principal-agent theory (as Acemoglu, 1999, points out) the contract is the 
mechanism designed to resolve the trade-off between incentive and insurance. The latter is 
closely related to risk behavior of economic agents. Incentive and risk behavior are also 
crucial in fisheries. Accordingly, we focus on developing a model that places particular 
emphasis on analyzing the integral relationship among incentive, effort, and risk behavior, as 
well as how this relationship leads to the remuneration decision. Our model is more general 
than the model developed by McConnell and Price in two respects. First, they consider only 
the case of a risk-neutral crew. Here, we examine all cases of risk behavior for both crew and 
owner. Second, we extend the McConnell-Price model by treating effort level as a continuous 
rather than a binary variable. 
 
Model Setup 
 
Our model consists of two parts: a representative crew member and the vessel owner. The 
vessel owner is the principal who designs a contract with the crew. It is noted that we con-
sider a representative crew member rather than the entire crew to make the model tractable. 
This approach differs from the assumption that the crew acts as if it were making decisions 
collectively. FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) provide an example of a model where difference be-
tween collective and individual decision making is illuminated in a similar setting. If the 
effort level is observable, the contract consists of two components: (a) the effort level, and 
(b) the corresponding wage of the crew. More realistically, effort level is not observed and 
only the latter is the contract element. 
 The crew’s effort level is denoted by a continuous variable, e and [ , ].L He e e Let π(e, ε) be 
the profit which is a function of effort level and other unobserved factors. More specifically, 
following Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), we assume the owner’s profit relates to 
the crew’s effort via the conditional probability density function f (π | e). In other words, the 
owner’s expected profit can be written as: 
( | ) ( | ) .E e f e d      
To make the model tractable, we consider the simple functional form,4 π(e) = e + ε, where ε 
represents all unobserved factors and is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean of 
zero and variance of σ2 [N(0, σ2)]. It follows that 
2( | ) ( | )  and  Var( | ) .E e f e d e e          
Note that the owner is not able to perfectly derive effort level based on the realized profit due 
to random factor ε. 
 With respect to the crew’s wage, the owner is assumed to offer a linear payment scheme in 
the form of w(π) = α + βπ, where β is the share ratio of profit for the crew. Notice that w = α 
as β = 0; thus, α can be considered a fixed wage level offered by the owner to the crew. In 
what follows, we first consider the conventional assumption of risk behavior between owner 
and crew.  
                                                 
4 As our editor pointed out, this is a simplified assumption. However, our main purpose in developing the theoretical model is to 
shed some light on the correlation between risk aversion and remuneration choice. To keep the model tractable and achieve 
interpretable results, we follow Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) who suggested the above profit function. 
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Conventional Risk Assumptions: Risk-Neutral Owner and Risk-Averse Crew 
 
First, like McConnell and Price (2006), we assume the owner is risk neutral given that she has 
more resources than the crew, and therefore can diversify investment easier. Her expected 
utility takes the form: ( ) [( | ) ( )].ownerE U E e w     In contrast, we follow the conventional 
assumption that the crew is risk averse. This assumption is considered standard in the 
literature (e.g., see Sutinen, 1979; Plourde and Smith, 1989; Matthiasson, 1999; McConnell 
and Price, 2006). More specifically, we assume the crew’s expected utility takes the following 
form: ( ) ( ) Var( ) ( ),crewE U E w w v e   where E(w) is the expected wage; φ is a parameter 
representing how risk averse the crew is; Var(w) is variance in the wage level denoted by σ2; 
and v(e) is the disutility function associated with the crew’s effort, such as fatigue experi-
enced by the crew from strenuous fishing activities. Following standard convention, v(e) is 
assumed to be strictly convex such that v′(e) > 0 and v″(e) > 0. The first assumption implies 
the value of discomfort increases as effort increases. The second assumption implies the value 
of discomfort increases at an increasing rate as effort increases. 
 Substituting the wage equation, w(π) =  + , into the crew’s expected utility expression, 
we have: 
(1)                         
2
2
2 2
( ) ( | ) Var( | ) ( )
( | ) Var( | ) ( )
( ) Var( ) ( )
( ).
crewE U E e e v e
E e e v e
E e e v e
e v e
       
      
         
     
 
Given the above notation, the owner is assumed to face the following programming model: 
(2)                  
( )
Max ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ( ) .owner
w
E U w f e d E e E w

             
This is equivalent to: 
(3)                            
, ,
Max ( ) Max ( | ) ( | ) ,owner
e
E U E e E e
 
      
subject to the individual rationality condition: , wherecrewEU U U is the reservation utility 
level of the crew. Substituting EU crew from (1), we have the following equivalent individual 
rationality condition: 
(4)                                              2 2 ( ) ,e v e U       
and the incentive compatibility condition: 
(5)                     2 2arg max ( ) arg max ( ) .crewe E U e v e              
The incentive compatibility condition means that given the contract (*, *) offered by the 
owner, the crew would best respond by exerting the effort level of e*. The individual ration-
ality (IR) expressed in equation (4) implies the crew member will accept the contract if and 
only if his utility gained from being employed by the owner is greater than his reservation 
utility. If it is not, he will choose an alternative job or elect to work in his home country, as in 
the case of a foreign crew member.  
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Model Solution 
 
The first-order condition from (4) above gives * = v′(e*). This result has a very nice eco-
nomic interpretation—namely, the marginal benefit of effort () is equal to its marginal cost 
[v′(e)]. Also, given v″(e) > 0, there is a one-to-one positive relation between  and e. The 
higher the effort level, the higher is the profit and vice versa. Note also that the owner can 
always make the individual rationality condition (4) binding. Thus, we have: 
(6)                                           2 2 ( ) .e v e U       
Substituting * = v′(e*) and solving for *, we have: 
(7)                                    2 2* * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) .v e v e v e e U         
 From equation (7) for *, we see that the higher the reservation utility level, the higher is 
the fixed portion of the crew’s wage. In the context of vessels with foreign crews in Hawaii’s 
longline fisheries, * is expected to be relatively small given the foreign crew members have 
a lower living standard in their home country. 
 Next, substituting *, * into (1) and solving the owner’s expected utility maximization 
program with respect to e would yield the following: 
(8)     
 2 2
2 2
2 2
Max ( ) Max | ( + )
Max ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( | )
Max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Max ( ) ( ) ( ) .
owner
e e
e
e
e
E U E e E
E e E v e v e v e e U E e
e v e v e v e e U v e e
e v e v e v e e U
    
           
          
        
 
By the first-order condition with respect to e, we then have: 
(9)                                     2* * *1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 0.v e v e v e       
Substituting * = v′(e*) and solving for * gives: 
(10)                                            * 2 *
1 .
1 2 ( )v e
     
 Equation (10) is the key finding of our theoretical model. From (10), we can see that 
* (0, 1], which is expected since  is the proportion of profit given to the crew. Also, the 
larger the variance in the profit level, σ2, the smaller the share of profit will be given to the 
crew. This result is very relevant to fisheries where the profit level by trip fluctuates 
considerably due to a host of uncontrollable factors. In extreme cases, variation in the profit 
can be so great that the profit level π = e + ε is largely determined by the unobserved factor ε. 
Accordingly, the owner finds it hard to tell which portion of the profit is determined by effort 
level. Consequently, she would prefer the fixed wage system (choosing  = 0). The risk 
parameter, φ, also plays an important role. The more risk averse the crew member, the lower 
will be his share of the profit. This finding is consistent with results reported by McConnell 
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and Price (2006). In the context of Hawaii, an increasing number of crew members are being 
hired from foreign countries. For these fishermen, fishing is their only source of income—
used to support them and to remit earnings to family in their home country. Therefore, they 
are very much averse to risk. This factor, in addition to the large variation in profit, makes  
even smaller. At some point, we can observe  = 0 as the case of a fixed wage system. 
 It is also interesting to examine the relationship between effort level and risk aversion. 
Eriksson, Teyssier, and Villeval (2006), in their economic experiment on the principal-agent 
model, conclude that more risk-averse participants exert less effort. From the first-order con-
dition, 1 − v′(e*) − 2φσ2v′(e*)v″(e*) = 0, and applying the implicit function theorem we have: 
(11)                           
2* * *
2 2* * * *
2 ( ) ( ) .
( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( )
de v e v e
d v e v e v e v e
          
 
 Thus, the sign of the relationship between effort and risk aversion depends on the sign of 
the third derivative of the effort disutility function v′″(e). With respect to v′″(e) > 0 (e.g., the 
marginal disutility function of effort is convex), we observe a negative relationship between 
effort level and risk aversion. Being risk averse, the agent may be afraid that the cost of 
exerting more effort is greater than his increased share of the profit which depends on other 
uncontrollable factors. 
 
General Case of Risk Behavior for the Owner and Crew 
 
We now consider the most general case of risk behavior for the owner and the crew. In 
this case, not only the crew member but also the owner consider their respective net income 
[π – w(π)] and variation in that income. Accordingly, the owner’s expected utility can be 
written as: 
(12)     [ ] ( ) ( ) Var ( ) ( ) ,ownerE U e w e w          
where γ is the owner’s level of risk aversion. Note that 
      2 2Var ( ) ( ) Var (1 )( ( )) Var (1 )( ) (1 ) .e w e e                
Therefore: 
(13)         2 2[ ] ( ) ( ) (1 ) .ownerE U e w         
The individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions are the same as those for the 
case of a risk-neutral owner. Following similar analysis, we can show that the owner faces the 
following programming model: 
(14)                  22 2Max [ ] Max ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) .owner
e
E U E e v e v e v e            
By the first-order condition with respect to e, we have: 
(15)     2* * * * *1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 0.v e v e v e v e v e               
Substituting v′(e*) = β* and rearranging gives:  
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Table 2. Optimal Values of  Under Different Risk Behavior Scenarios 
 Risk-Averse Owner Risk-Neutral Owner 
Risk-Averse Crew 0 < *oc < 1 0 < *oc < *c < 1 
Risk-Neutral Crew * = 1 * = 1 
Notes: *oc corresponds to the case in which both the crew and owner are risk averse; *c corresponds to the 
case in which only the crew is risk averse. 
 
 
(16)     2 * 2 2* * *1 2 ( ) 1 2 ( ) 2 ( ) .v e v e v e             
Thus, 
(17)     
2 *
*
2 2* *
1 2 ( ) .
1 2 ( ) 2 ( )
v e
v e v e
         
From (17), we have: 
(18)     
2 *
22 2 *
 2 ( ) = 0.
1 + 2 ( ) 2 ( )
v e
v e v e
        
 
In other words, the more risk averse is the owner, the more willing she would be to increase 
the share of profit to the crew. The case in which the crew is risk neutral (i.e., φ = 0) is also of 
interest. Here, we have * = 1. Hence, the owner’s income is expressed as π –  – π = −; 
accordingly,  < 0. This will be equivalent to the situation where the owner leases the 
boat to the crew who pay the owner a fixed rent of  for use of the boat. Table 2 sum-
marizes the optimal crew shares for all possible combinations of risk behaviors of the 
crew and owner. 
 For the case of the risk-neutral crew, the main concern is the profit level. The owner’s opti-
mal strategy is to lease the vessel to the crew and receive a fixed rent (Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
and Green, 1995). The risk-averse owner is willing to pay a higher portion of the realized 
profit to the crew in exchange for risk sharing. Accordingly, the share of the profit for the 
crew is higher under the case of a risk-averse owner than under the risk-neutral owner. Also, 
given v′(e*) = *, the more risk averse the owner, the higher is * and the higher is the optimal 
effort level e*. 
 Examining the fixed portion of the crew’s wage level , from 
2 2 ** * * *= ( ) + ( ) ( ) + v e v e v e e U      
we have: 
(19)         
*
* * *
*
( ) 2 ( ) .d v e v e e
de
        
 The interrelationships of * with * and e* are thus less tractable unless we further assume 
some specific functional form of v(e).  
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Empirical Model and Data 
Before proceeding to the empirical exercise, we can infer ceteris paribus from the profit 
function [π(e) = e + ε] that the higher the effort level, the higher the profit level. However, the 
crew’s effort is unobservable. Instead, we look at the relationship between the crew’s share 
and profit level. One finding from the theoretical model is that there is a one-to-one positive 
relation between β* and e*: β* = v′(e*). Accordingly, e* = g(β*), where g(·) is an inverse 
function of v′(·). Substituting e* = g(β*) into the profit function π(e) = e + ε, we obtain π(β*) = 
g(β*) + ε. This implies at the equilibrium dπ(β)/dβ = g′(β*) = 1/v″(β*), which is greater than 
zero by assumption. 
 
An Empirical Model 
This section seeks to empirically check the theoretical prediction of the positive correlation 
between the crew’s share and the vessel’s profit. We also investigate the related question—
Does a share contract system generate higher economic returns than a flat wage regime? In 
theory, the share parameter β is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. According to the 
theoretical model, a higher β corresponds to higher economic returns. Due to the absence of 
detailed information regarding the crew’s share in ex post revenue, we consider two cases: the 
pure fixed wage (i.e., β = 0) and the share contract (i.e., 0 < β < 1) systems. 
 Because profit information is not available in our data, we use revenue as a proxy for the 
profit variable. Also, taking into account the multiple output feature of the longline fisheries, 
average trip revenue is used as the performance measure (the dependent variable) in this 
study. Average trip revenue is calculated by dividing the vessel’s annual revenue into the 
number of fishing trips the vessel operated in 2004.5 Fishing revenue is postulated to be 
affected by several factors (explanatory variables) known to have potential impacts on fishing 
revenue. One such variable is the remuneration method implemented. 
 To estimate the impact of share contracts on fishing revenue, one may consider using the 
following model: 
(20)       ,Y I    X  
where Y is the fishing revenue, X is a vector of explanatory variables, and I is a binary 
variable indicating whether the vessel employs share contracts or flat wages (I = 1 if the 
vessel uses share contracts, and I = 0 if the vessel uses flat wages). However, this model may 
result in inconsistent estimates from the effect of share contracts on fishing revenue because 
employing share contracts may generate interaction effects with observed or unobserved 
vessel characteristics (Maddala, 1983; Kim et al., 1999). For instance, the level of technology 
of a vessel influences the vessel remuneration methods; yet similarly, the level of technology 
is correlated to revenue. If the decision to use share contracts is based on individual selec-
tion, there may exist selection biases6 whereby share contract vessels may have systematically
                                                 
5 We realize that the average profit per trip would provide a more informative measure of crew work effort intensity than the 
average revenue per trip. Unfortunately, we don’t have information on profit. Clearly, the use of revenue as a proxy for profit in our 
case is less than desirable. Nevertheless, we believe the use of revenue as a proxy can shed some light on crew effort on economic 
returns in general. 
6 In theory, the self-selectivity of remuneration regime may exist for both owners and crews. On the one hand, the owner offers 
compensation conditional on her attributes and expected revenues. On the other hand, the crew determines whether to accept the 
offer conditional on the crew’s attributes and expected revenues. In the context of the Hawaii longline fishery, the majority of 
crews are foreigners whose main objective is to be employed by a vessel owner, regardless of remuneration practice, to have salary 
for sending financial assistance back to family at home. Consequently, we can assume that the remuneration choice endogeneity 
refers to owner’s behavior only. 
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different characteristics from flat wage vessels (Kim et al., 1999). Vessel characteristics may 
also have different impacts on revenue depending on the type of remuneration. The impact, 
for example, from hooks per set on revenue for vessels using share contracts may differ from 
vessels using flat wages. 
 To correct for these problems, we invoke the switching regression model (Maddala, 1983), 
which simultaneously estimates the selection equation and two revenue regression equations 
for share contract and fixed wage vessels. The empirical model follows closely the formula-
tion of Lokshin and Sajaia (2005). To consider a model that describes choosing remuneration 
systems with two regression equations, we define a criterion function I determining whether 
or not the vessel employs share contracts: 
(21)        1 if 0,
0 if 0,
i i i
i i i
I u
I u
   
   
Z
Z
 
where Ii = 1 if vessel i uses share contracts, and Ii = 0 if vessel i uses fixed wages. Zi is a 
vector of variables influencing vessels’ contractual choice; Zi includes the vessel’s current 
appraised value, the number of hooks used per fishing set, and a binary variable indicating the 
ease with which the vessel can find local crew. It is expected that the higher the vessel’s 
current appraised value and the higher the number of hooks per set, the less the vessel’s rev-
enue depends on the crew and the more likely the vessel’s owner will apply fixed wage. Also, 
given that local crew may be less risk averse than foreign crew, the easier it is for the owner 
to find local crew and the more likely she will apply a share contract. 
 The revenue regression equations for share contract and flat wage vessels then can be 
defined as: 
(22)           1 1 1 if 1,i i i iy I    X  
(23)           2 2 2 if 0 ,i i i iy I    X  
where y1i and y2i are the average trip revenue for share contract and flat wage vessels, respec-
tively. Xi is a vector of explanatory variables thought to affect vessel revenue, including the 
current appraised vessel value and the number of hooks used per fishing set.7 These two 
variables represent the technological status of the vessel, and are therefore expected to have a 
positive impact on the vessel revenue. 
 Assume also that 1 2, , andi i iu   follow a trivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
the covariance matrix: 
2
1 2
2
1 1
2
2 2
σ σ σ
σ ,
σ σ
u u u
u
u
      
  
where 2 ,u  21 ,  and 22  are variances of the error terms in the selection equation (21), the 
share contract equation (22), and the flat wage equation (23), respectively; σ21 and σ31 repre-
sent the covariances between the error term in the selection equation (21) and the respective 
error terms in equations (22) and (23).  
                                                 
7 In the revenue regression, we include capital and labor as inputs. Note that, in addition to these variables, fish stock and 
captain’s experience are important determinants. We don’t have fish stock information in the data. In separate model estimations 
(not reported here), we included the captain’s experience; however, the findings were not significantly different from those reported 
in this paper. Therefore, we use the current model because it is simpler and yields the same results. 
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 Given these assumptions of the error terms, the logarithmic likelihood function for equa-
tions (22) and (23) can be expressed as: 
(24)                  
   
   
1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2 2
ln ( ) ln ( / ) /
ln .
(1 ) ln 1 ( ) ln ( / ) /
i i i
i i i i
I F f
L
I F f
                      
  
F(·) and f (·) are the cumulative distribution and the distribution function, respectively; η ji is 
defined as follows: 
(25)           
 
2
/
, 1,2,
1
i j ji j
ji
j
j
      

Z
 
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the correlation coefficients of u with ε1 and ε2, respectively. 
 We are particularly interested in the potential revenue gain/loss in the event a vessel uses 
an alternative method of remuneration. We expect that the empirical results should yield 
the differences in vessel revenue when share contract vessels switch to a flat wage system 
instead, and vice versa. To verify this expectation, the following conditional expectations are 
constructed: 
 The conditional expectation of revenue of a vessel using a share contract is written as: 
(26)               1 11 1 1 1 ( )| 1, .( ) ii i i i i
fE y I x x
F
      
Z
Z
 
The conditional expectation of revenue of a share contract vessel if it applied flat wage is 
given by: 
(27)              2 20 1 1 2 ( )| 1, .( ) ii i i i i
f
E y I x x
F
      
Z
Z
 
The expected potential gain/loss of a share contract vessel if it applied flat wage is repre-
sented by: 
(28)              0 1 1 1| 1, | 1, .i i i i i iE y I x E y I x    
Similarly, the conditionally expected revenue of a flat wage vessel if it applied a share contract 
is specified as: 
(29)              1 11 2 2 1 ( )| 0, .1 ( )ii i i i i
f
E y I x x
F
       
Z
Z
 
The conditional expectation of revenue of a vessel using flat wage is: 
(30)              2 20 2 2 2 ( )| 0, .1 ( )ii i i i i
f
E y I x x
F
       
Z
Z
 
Finally, the expected potential gain/loss of a flat wage vessel when applying a share contract 
instead is expressed as: 
(31)              1 2 0 2| 0, | 0, .i i i i i iE y I x E y I x     
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Data 
 
Data collected and used for this study are taken from the 2004 Hawaii-based Longline Tech-
nology Survey (HLTS), which provides baseline fishing technology information and some 
economic information on the Hawaii-based domestic longline fleet. The unit of survey is an 
individual longline vessel, with a total of 86 surveyed vessels. Traditionally, the Hawaii long-
line fisheries include both tuna and swordfish. However, the HLTS focused only on the tuna 
fishery, due to the late reopening of the swordfish fishery in 2004. 
 The survey questionnaire included two main sections. The first requested key information 
on the number of crew, remuneration method, and fishing experience of the captain. The 
second section focused on the technology on board the vessel—a list of all electronic equip-
ment (e.g., satellite communication system, computers, etc.), dates when each piece of tech-
nological equipment was adopted, and the purchase price of each piece of equipment. The 
appraised current vessel value was used as a proxy for the overall technological status of the 
vessel. We note that the appraised value might not be a good indicator of technology because 
it accounts for depreciation. For instance, if there are two vessels with exactly the same equip- 
ment but with different vessel age, their appraised values may differ but their technologies are 
the same. With this in mind, we ran econometric models controlling for the vessel’s age; 
however, the findings were not significantly different from those reported here. 
 Because the HLTS did not survey vessel revenue information, two other sources of data 
were employed in this study. The first data set, from the Hawaii Division of Aquatic 
Resources (HDAR), provided detailed information in 2004 on each vessel’s catch, by species, 
with its corresponding auction price. Based on this information, the vessel’s annual revenue 
was estimated as well as the total number of fishing trips taken during that year. The second 
data set, from logbook data provided by the National Marine Fisheries Services, contained 
detailed information on the quantity of fish (by species) landed and kept per vessel. These 
three data sets were linked using vessel names and permit numbers. The combined data are 
used for the empirical exercise. 
 Table 3 presents three key relationships between vessel characteristics and remuneration 
regime found in the combined data. First, if the vessel crew size is larger than five, there is a 
high probability vessels will use a fixed wage regime. However, vessels using hired captains 
rather than those with owner-operators have a higher probability of adopting a share contract 
regime. Third, if it is easy to find the crew, there is a high probability that vessels will employ 
a share contract. 
 
Model Specification 
 
There are two important variables used in the analysis: remuneration choice and average 
revenue per trip. The remuneration choice (binary) variable equals 1 if there is at least one 
crew member hired by share contract in addition to the captain, and 0 otherwise.8 These two 
variables form the foundation for the estimation procedures. Appendix table A1 briefly 
defines all the variables used in the empirical model.  
                                                 
8 In actuality, the remuneration system used among Hawaii longline fishing boats is a bit more complex than what we are 
assuming here. Some vessels had split crews such as a Vietnamese captain, first mate, and cook (who all fished, too), and a crew of 
foreign workers (e.g., Filipinos, Micronesians, etc.). The captain, first mate, and cook were paid on share contract and the foreign 
crew by fixed wage. 
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                 Table 3. Main Vessel Characteristics by Remuneration Regime 
 
Vessel Characteristic 
Share Contract 
(%) 
Flat Wage 
(%) 
Number of Crew:   
 Equal to 5 47.9 52.1 
 Less than 5 87.5 12.5 
 Greater than 5 45.4 54.6 
Owner-Operator:   
 Yes 48.7 51.3 
 No 59.2 40.8 
Difficulty in Finding a Local Crew:  
 Very difficult 45.4 54.6 
 Not much 74.0 26.0 
Number of Vessels 55 45 
 
 As part of the switching regression procedure, a probit model is used to investigate the 
determinants of employing share contracts in the Hawaii longline fisheries. There are two sets 
of independent variables. The first set includes all explanatory variables in the revenue 
regression equations. Such inclusion takes into account the fact that fishing revenue also has 
an impact on the owner’s decision to use share contracts. Owners will be more likely to 
employ a share contract if it results in higher revenue than the flat wage. Hence, factors that 
have an impact on revenue may also have correspondingly similar impacts on the remuner-
ation choice. Also, Wooldridge (2004a) notes that including the second stage’s variables in 
the first stage makes the estimations consistent, and is not very costly. 
 The second set of independent variables in the share contract equation aims at satisfying 
the identification condition. Nonlinearity is not sufficient to meet the identification condition; 
rather, additional identifying variables are added in the first equation. These variables are not 
included in the revenue equations. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) caution that the use of 
weak instruments is problematic since the potential bias does not disappear even in a large 
sample. Given the small sample size of our data, it is even more crucial to choose good instru-
ments. We also follow Wooldridge (2004b) by not using any interaction term to limit the 
number of over-identifying restrictions. In particular, we include three instrumental variables: 
(a) a binary variable representing the ease with which owners find crew,9 (b) the ethnicity of 
the vessel owner, and (c) a binary variable indicating whether the captain is also the vessel 
owner. These variables do not significantly impact vessel revenue, but rather have a signifi-
cant impact on the owner’s decision to use share contracts. 
 In addition to share contracts, other potential determinants of fishing revenue were inte-
grated into the model. We make use of the vessel’s width as a proxy for the size of the vessel. 
The number of fishing hooks used per set was included as a proxy to measure the utilization 
of a vessel’s potential fishing capacity. The more hooks used per set, the more a vessel could 
utilize its fishing capacity potential. The number of crew served as a proxy for the vessel’s 
human resources. The size of the crew is expected to have a positive correlation with the 
vessel revenue.  
                                                 
9 In the 2004 Hawaii-based Longline Technology Survey (HLTS), there is one question asking how easy it is for the owner to 
find local crew. We use this information to generate the corresponding binary variable. 
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Table 4. Mean Comparisons by Main Characteristics of Vessels 
 
 
Vessel Characteristic 
Total 
Sample 
[1] 
Share 
Contract 
[2] 
Flat 
Wage 
[3] 
 
p-Value 
[2]–[3] 
Vessel’s trip revenue ($) 31,295 30,714 31,920 0.730 
Vessel’s appraised current value ($) 428,116 456,316 393,548 0.130 
Caucasian owner 37 24 13  
Korean owner 29 12 17  
Vietnamese owner 20 11 9  
Time crew working together (years) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.460 
Hooks per set 1,945 1,924 1,968 0.720 
Vessel’s width 21.15 20.58 21.83 0.055* 
Ease in finding local crew (easy = 1) 0.36 0.47 0.23 0.010*** 
Number of crew 5.12 4.90 5.30 0.005*** 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The p-values are based on a one-tailed t-test. 
 
 Table 4 shows a comparison of descriptive statistics between share contract and fixed wage 
vessels. As observed from table 4, fixed wage vessels outperform share contract vessels in 
terms of revenue. Share contract vessels have higher appraised current value, whereas flat 
wage vessels utilize more hooks per set. This contrast highlights different strategies to 
improve total revenue. Share contract vessels focus on technological investments, while flat 
wage vessels emphasize increasing the number of hooks used per set. These differences are, 
however, insignificant. The significant difference of greatest interest is the ease in finding 
local crew. As expected, it is much easier for share contract vessels to find local crew than it 
is for fixed wage vessels. 
 
Main Empirical Results 
 
Table 5 presents the determinants of the share contract decision. One of the key factors in 
determining remuneration regimes is the ease of finding a local crew. The easier it is for the 
owner to find a local crew, the more likely she prefers using share contracts. This finding 
reflects present circumstances within the Hawaii longline fisheries. As owners experience a 
shortage in the supply of local fishermen, owners must depend on a third party to find foreign 
crew. As implied by our theoretical model [and consistent with the McConnell-Price (2006) 
model], it might be in the owner’s interest to use fixed wages given the high level of risk 
aversion among foreign crew. 
 Vessels with larger crews also prefer flat wages over share contracts, possibly because of 
the trade-off between the quality and quantity of the crew. It is likely that vessel owners of 
large crew do not place much emphasis on the marginal productivity of each crew member, 
which is hard to identify. Meanwhile, owners with a small number of crew may believe in the 
quality of crew, and thus use a share contract as a mechanism to increase marginal produc-
tivity of each crew member.  
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                 Table 5. Determinants of Share Contract Decision 
 
Vessel Characteristic 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Number of hooks per set 0.000 0.001 
Number of crew −0.526** 0.268 
Width of vessel −0.064 0.053 
Easy to find local crew (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.371* 0.202 
Korean vs. Caucasian vessels 0.076 0.428 
Vietnamese vs. Caucasian vessels 0.254 0.511 
Owner-operated vessels 0.018 0.308 
Constant 2.938* 1.687 
No. of observations = 77   
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
 
 The effect of a vessel’s characteristics on its fishing revenue is different between share 
contract and flat wage vessels (table 6). The number of hooks per set has a significant impact 
on fishing revenue only for share contract vessels. The effect of the vessel’s width (which is a 
proxy for the vessel’s size) on fishing revenue is consistently significant in these two groups 
of vessels—both remuneration strategies produce higher economic returns in the larger 
vessels. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for the share contract equation is greater than 
that for the flat wage equation, which implies share contract vessels may make more efficient 
use of vessel size than their flat wage counterparts. Concerning the effect of the crew size on 
revenue, the more crew members there are, the higher is the revenue realized. However, this 
effect is significant only among the share contract vessels. This result is consistent with our 
discussion above regarding the trade-off between quality and quantity of crew. It is likely that 
share contract vessels place more emphasis on the quality of crew; therefore, an increase in 
the number of crew among share contract vessels leads to more significant improvement in 
revenue compared to flat wage vessels. 
 The estimated correlation coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 between the error term in the selection 
equation and the error terms in the share contract and flat wage revenue equations reveal any 
selection bias in the share contract decision ρ1 is statistically significant, but ρ2, though it is 
negative, is insignificant. Given both ρ1 and ρ2 are negative, one can infer that the flat wage 
vessels may have an “absolute advantage”—i.e., flat wage vessels would have above-average 
performance whether they chose to use share contract or not. In this case, share contract 
vessels have below-average performance whether they chose to use share contract or not. In 
other words, the flat wage vessels are generally better fishers. 
 Having estimated the parameters of the switching regression models, we can calculate the 
expected gains and losses from counterfactual revenue differences [equations (28) and (31)]. 
These results will show whether it is economically beneficial for the share contract vessels to 
employ flat wages, and conversely whether it is better for the flat wage vessels to employ 
share contracts. 
 Table 7 reports the differences between the expected revenue of the counterfactual and 
expected revenue of the actual. The counterfactual is defined as the expected revenue a share 
contract (flat wage) vessel would have generated if it had used flat wages (share contracts). 
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Table 6. Parameter Estimates of the Revenue Equations 
 Share Contract  Fixed Wage 
Vessel Characteristic Coefficient   Std. Error  Coefficient   Std. Error   
Number of hooks per set 12.563*** 3.419        2.350 4.311        
Number of crew 4,027**   1,849       1,104        2,472        
Width of vessel 1,176***  406        970***  373        
Constant −3,372***  1,067        −803        22,001        
1 −0.813** 0.345          
2 −0.221 1.217          
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
           Table 7. Counterfactural versus Expected Revenue 
 
 
Vessel RemunerationType 
Difference Between 
Counterfactual and 
Expected Actual Revenue 
 
 
p-Value 
Share contract −3,141** 0.01 
Flat wage 12,350*** 0.00 
Note: Double and triple asterisks (**,***) denote statistical significance at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 A key conclusion is that flat wage vessels would markedly increase their revenue margins 
if they applied share contracts. This finding has significant implications for the Hawaii long-
line fisheries, as more share contract vessels have recently switched to the use of flat wages. 
A major reason for this change is that foreign crew are currently the main source of fishermen 
in Hawaii. Foreign crew may be more risk averse than local crew because of their dependence 
on fishing as a sole source of income. As implied by the theoretical model, it is optimal for 
the owner to use flat wage in the case of very risk-averse crew. Yet, not all foreign crew are 
very risk averse; some of them may even be risk neutral or risk preferring. Under such 
circumstances, it might be more beneficial for the owner to adopt a share contract. Put 
concisely, a more flexible remuneration system may be better than a pure fixed wage regime. 
This finding corroborates results reported by Eriksson, Teyssier, and Villeval (2006) who 
found that workers would exert more effort if they had the flexibility of choosing the remu-
neration practice in accordance with their risk preference. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
It is an interesting exercise to investigate how rights-based management of the fishery, 
especially the shallow-set certificate program, might affect the type of crew remuneration 
regime. In the context of our study, it is worth noting that the shallow-set certificate program 
is more applicable to swordfish in the Hawaii longline fishery than to the tuna fishery in 
which the deep set is used. Also, after having been closed in Hawaii for two years, the sword- 
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fish fishery was reopened in 2004 under a “set cap” program. Given this special feature of 
Hawaii’s swordfish fishery, our data include information on the tuna fishery only, which had 
no quota program as of 2004. 
 Despite the above limitation, our findings still offer some relevant policy implications for 
Hawaii fisheries in which more focus is given to rights-based fishery management. In 
particular, under the quota system, the owners may find it beneficial to increase the labor 
intensity of the active crew without too much compensation to the crew in order to make the 
best use of the quota (Guyader and Thebaud, 2001). As such, the owners may prefer the fixed 
wage over the share contract since the former allows the owners to increase the length of 
fishing trips by paying the same amount of monthly wage to the crew. 
 A number of other studies also show that the quota system may lead to reduction in the 
share for crew. For instance, according to Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell (1995, p. 153): 
Wages to crew may change if owners readjust the share system to enhance their profit or 
to maintain their position within this increasingly competitive industry or to account for 
the cost of purchased quotas.… Returns to crew may fall if crew-share agreements change 
to reflect the cost of obtaining ITQs and the opportunity cost of using them. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper attempts to systematically answer the question: “Why is the share contract regime 
the optimal form of remuneration in the fisheries sector?” By focusing on the Hawaii longline 
fisheries, where flat wage has recently become the preferred mode of remuneration, we have a 
strong case to test this theoretical prediction. Using the principal-agent approach, we develop 
a simple and comprehensive model that takes into account the roles of both incentive and risk 
behavior to explain the underlying mechanism of remuneration choice in fisheries. Our model 
suggests there is a trade-off between incentive and risk aversion. The more risk averse is the 
crew, the less incentive will be brought about by the contract. Accordingly, it might be opti-
mal for the owner to use fixed wage under certain circumstances. As in the case of Hawaii’s 
longline fisheries, one of the primary reasons for the substitution of fixed wage for share 
contract has been the lack of local crew members keeping longlining as their primary occupa-
tion. As a result, the vessel owner is constrained to hire foreign crew who are more risk 
averse than local crew. The high level of risk aversion among foreign crews is likely one of 
the key reasons for the recent observed move to fixed wage in remuneration practice. 
 Empirically, this is one of the first studies to investigate the impact of share contracts on 
fishing productivity. Results of the counterfactual simulations reveal that vessels employing 
flat wages would produce higher fishing revenues if they were to adopt a more flexible 
remuneration system that best fit the crew’s risk behavior, rather than a pure fixed wage 
regime. More specifically, it may be better for the Hawaii longline fleet if foreign crews have 
the opportunity to choose a remuneration scheme that fits their risk behavior rather than 
letting the remuneration strategy be solely determined by the vessel owners. 
 Our model shows that risk behavior of the crew and owner plays an important role in 
deciding how large the optimal revenue-sharing parameter β should be. This investigation 
could have yielded more profound findings if data on risk preferences had been available. A 
promising extension of the study would be to conduct an experiment on risk preferences 
among crew and owners in Hawaii’s longline fishery. The resulting experimental data could 
then be combined with data used here.  
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 We note several limitations of this study. First, the theoretical model investigates the rela-
tionship between risk aversion of the owner and crew and choice of remuneration. However, 
the current data set does not contain measures of “risk aversion” for either party. Conducting 
a field experiment on risk preferences of Hawaii longline fishermen would be a worthwhile 
extension. Second, we do not have the data for specific values of the share parameter β; thus, 
instead of treating β as a continuous variable, we simply treat it as a binary variable. The 
theoretical model predicts that the greater the percentage of the crew share, the higher will be 
the vessel revenue. It would be useful to explore how a change in the shared revenue portions 
impacts revenue margins. 
 Along this line, an interesting policy dimension10 of this work would be an assessment of 
how rights-based management of the fishery might affect the type of crew remuneration 
regime. Of particular interest here would be the impact of the annual cap on aggregate long-
line sets in the Hawaii-based shallow set longline fishery on the form of crew remuneration 
regime. The total allowable sets are allocated to the vessels permitted to operate in the fishery 
in the form of tradable set shares. Tradable set shares are a component of a regulatory 
package designed to limit turtle takes in the fishery. A side effect of this policy would be the 
impact on risk associated with exclusive access to the target stocks. For example, one might 
hypothesize that given this right, risk associated with open access would be greatly reduced—
in which case there likely would be a greater use of the flat wage crew remuneration regime. 
In terms of future investigations, this study could be enhanced by considering the impact of 
this particular policy, or alternative rights-based conservation and management approaches, 
on aggregate employment and profitability in the fishery. 
 There are also a number of interesting facets of remuneration in Hawaii longline fisheries 
that offer grounds for future investigation. First, foreign crew and local crew may consist of 
different labor qualities. These differences in quality may have an impact on an owner’s 
decision regarding remuneration strategies. An owner, for example, may be more inclined to 
use share contracts with high-quality labor. Further studies of the determinants that influence 
labor quality can be a fruitful area for future research. Second, the Hawaii longline fisheries 
consist of three ethnicities of vessel owners, which imply different decision-making behaviors. 
Asian owners, for example, might prefer share contracts that promote cooperation. Examining 
the effect of ethnicity on remuneration choice is a topic of great relevance. Finally, an owner 
with a fleet of vessels may prefer to apply the same kind of remuneration on all of her boats. 
Given that it is not uncommon for an owner to possess multiple boats in the Hawaii longline 
fisheries, another potential extension of this paper would be to explore how this feature influ-
ences the use of a particular remuneration strategy. 
 
[Received February 2009; final revision received July 2009.] 
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Table A1. A Brief Definition of Variables in the Empirical Model 
Variable Definition 
Share contract Binary variable: = 1 if vessel applies share contracts, = 0 if vessel  
applies flat wages 
Vessel’s trip revenue Average revenue of vessel per trip 
Vessel’s appraised current value Estimated value of the vessel 
Owner ethnicity Ethnic traits of vessel owner: 1 = Caucasian, 2 = Korean-American,  
3 = Vietnamese-American 
Time crew working together Years the same crew spent working together 
Hooks per set Average number of hooks used per fishing set 
Ease in finding local crew members How easy is it to find a local fisherman? 1 = easy, 0 = otherwise 
 
